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Abstract 
 
Collective intelligence is easily observable in 
group-based or interpersonal pairwise interaction, 
and is enabled by environment-mediated stigmertic 
signals. Based on innate ability, human sensors not 
only sense and coordinate, but also tend to solve 
problems through these signals. This paper argues 
the efficacy of computational intelligence for 
adopting the collective language-action cues of 
human intelligence as stigmertic signals to 
differentiate deception. A study was conducted in 
synchronous computer-mediated communication 
environment with a dataset collected from 2014 to 
2015. An online game was developed to examine the 
accuracy of certain language-action cues (signs), 
deceptive actors (agents) during pairwise interaction 
(environment). The result of a logistic regression 
analysis demonstrates the computational efficacy of 
collective language-action cues in differentiating and 
sensing deception in spontaneous communication. 
This study contributes to the computational modeling 
in adapting human intelligence as a base to attribute 
computer-mediated deception. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Pairwise interaction can facilitate our cognitive 
understanding of each other, and language provides 
the means for effective communication. Differences 
in context, differences among the parties involved, 
differences in time, place, and even communication 
medium—each influence not only what is 
communicated but also how communication is 
perceived. For example, a humorously sarcastic 
remark about the economy made to friends while 
socializing on Friday evening may very well be 
entirely inappropriate were it to be made at work 
during a budget meeting on Monday morning. 
Likewise, taking the words from one conversation 
and applying them in another can imbue the words 
with an entirely different meaning to the original—
and presumably intended—meaning. In the context of 
computer-mediated communication, language-action 
cues can become important indicators in identifying 
computer-mediated deception [1]. Cues found in 
language help enable collective understanding, and 
thus provide communication context for collective 
intelligence. In this regard, communicative signals 
shared by communicators are also critically important 
in assisting deceptive intent in computer-mediated 
communication (CMC). 
As CMC users are currently being exposed to an 
increasing number and variety of risks associated 
with computer-mediated deception (e.g., 
unauthorized access to one’s personally identifiable 
information, identity theft, as well as spear phishing 
attacks), it is becoming more and more important—
and challenging—for users to be able to protect 
themselves from these deceptive tricks. Our ability to 
understand a message and thereby correctly interpret 
a sender’s communicated intent and meaning 
becomes ever important. In face-to-face (F2F) 
communication, the receiver’s assessment of context 
is informed not only by words, but also by other 
physical cues such as body language and facial 
expressions. In “cue lean” text-based CMC, the 
message receiver only has reference to the message 
sender’s words themselves. Consequently, the 
intelligence generated in human interaction becomes 
one of the few means available to assess the intent of 
the individual(s) with whom one is communicating, 
as well as the truthfulness or reliability of the 
information being exchanged. 
Human sensors not only have the intuitive ability 
to coordinate, but also the innate capability to sense 
and respond to anomalies. In this paper, we first 
describe the concept of collective intelligence; 
specifically, the human sensor’s ability to detect 
deception in an interaction network is emphasized. 
We then review deceptive communication styles, 
which forms the core components of stigmergy; 
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deceivers (agents), cues (signs) across different 
contexts (environment). Next, we discuss a study 
conducted to investigate the stigmergy in the pairwise 
communication context. We compare and contrast the 
findings of this examination into communication 
cues. The paper concludes with some reflections, 
implications, and limitations, along with potential 
directions for future research. 
 
2. Collective Intelligence 
 
Collective intelligence refers to complex behavior 
created by the simple interaction between individuals 
that follow basic rules, and is generally defined as 
“the ability of a group to solve more problems than 
its individual members” [2]. A simple example can 
be the ants’ or bees’ ability to map out their 
environment. Individually, these insects experience 
limited capacity in processing information; however, 
collectively, they can decide the fields to which they 
exploit and the danger about to occur. The collective 
cognition is demonstrated and communicated through 
a “stigmergic signal [2],” or an innate “gene [3],” in 
these insects’ society. In human society, people 
interact more autonomously due to different 
communication modes and medium. Nonetheless, 
people can work and coordinate together to solve 
complex problems in a surprisingly intelligent way. 
Malone, Laubacher et al. [3] illustrated the open 
source software development community as a 
prototypical example of collective intelligence. 
The genes of collective intelligence can create, 
decide and build a genome of any shape and kind by 
asking simple questions of Who, What, Where, Why 
and How [3]. Likewise, the genes can also sense 
differences and anomalies in coordination activities. 
Individuals pick up communication cues, find 
information, and make their own decisions that then 
influence the group’s intelligence and the results of 
collective problem solving. Although, a group’s 
decisions can be influenced by the individuals’ 
decisions and sharing of information, Woolley, 
Chabris et al. [4] examined the collective intelligence 
factor, and identified that this “c factor” does not 
depend on the average individual intelligence, but 
depends more on the average social sensitivity of 
group members, which reflects the composition of 
the group (e.g., equality in distribution of 
conversational turn-taking), and the way the group 
members interact (e.g., communication mode and 
medium) when they are assembled. 
Based on the observations of the insect swarm-
behavior, Dipple, Raymond et al. [5] proposed a 
macro-level view of the communication mechanism 
that triggers responses in human society. Depending 
on environment-mediated signals, this model defines 
an abstract form of stigma semantics in stigmergy 
with the core components: the agents, the 
environment, and the sign(s). The agent’s ability to 
coordinate, to sense, or to detect anomalies depends 
on their interpretation of the meaning as mediated by 
the manifestation of stigmergic signals and signs 
when interacting. These core components also 
correspond to the fundamentals of human sensors’ 
ability to interpret and sense deceptive 
communication. 
 
3. Deceptive Communication 
 
A common focus of the numerous studies on 
deceptive communication is to identify particular 
cues (behavioral, contextual, verbal or textual) that 
can be associated with deception. Collectively, these 
studies reveal several essential aspects of deception. 
First, deception is “…a message knowingly 
transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or 
conclusion by the receiver” [6]. Thus, deception is a 
volitional and intentional act. Simple “mistakes of 
fact” would not constitute deception. Neither would it 
be considered deception when a message sender 
objectively communicates false information when 
s/he believed the information to be true [7]. In 
addition, research suggests that both the mode of 
communication (synchronous [8] or asynchronous 
[9]) and the specific medium chosen may provide 
insight into to the type (planned or on-the-fly) and 
severity (serious or inconsequential) of the deception 
[10]. Finally, our ability to detect deception, in any 
environment, depends on many different factors, 
including the availability of certain types of cues. 
These cues can function as an alert to the receiver to 
be more critical of the information being provided. 
Unfortunately, in a CMC environment, the 
availability of cues is reduced (being limited to the 
text in message-based exchanges) when compared to 
F2F communication, thereby making detection of 
deception particularly challenging in CMC. 
 
3.1. Deceptive Agents 
 
Communication is, of necessity, interactive. It 
involves a sender and one or more receiver(s) who 
are engaged in a (more-or-less) interactive exchange. 
Within this exchange, there is an opportunity for the 
message sender to influence the receiver(s) actions or 
beliefs. Deceptive communication fundamentally 
means purposefully misrepresenting or concealing 
the truth, either by omission or commission [11]. 
Miller, Deturck et al. [12] described deceptive 
communication as “…a general persuasive strategy 
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that aims at influencing the beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviors of others by means of deliberate message 
distortions” (p. 99). Miller and Stiff [13] and Stiff 
[14] characterized deceptive communication as an act 
involving the intentional use of persuasive strategies 
and activities to manipulate the receiver. Buller and 
Burgoon’s [6] interpersonal deception theory (IDT) 
further examines and explains how a deceiver (i.e., 
sender of a deceptive communication) strategically 
shapes his/her communication behaviors by studying 
the perceptions and suspicions of the receiver(s). As a 
major theoretical lens, IDT views deceptive 
communication as a strategic, interactive process on 
the part of all parties, through which the deceiver 
attempts to accomplish multiple objectives—
including impression management, emotion 
management and conversational management. IDT 
suggests that, much like the move-and-counter-move 
dynamics of a chess match, the influence of the 
deceiver’s behavior on the receiver affects the 
receiver’s behavior, which, in turn, affects the 
deceiver’s strategy and behavior. 
There are two critical truths about deception one 
must appreciate. First, deception is common, 
occurring in approximately one–quarter of all 
communications [6], and second, if we charge 
humans to detect deception, they tend to be bad at it 
[1, 15]. 
 
3.2. Language-action Cues and Signs 
 
3.2.1. F2F. F2F communication has an “advantage” 
over CMC in terms of deception detection, in that 
both verbal and nonverbal (i.e., physical) cues are 
available to the message receiver. Indeed, physical 
nonverbal cues are more-or-less exclusive to F2F, 
and include everything from body language and 
facial expressions to the tone and pitch of voice and 
pace of speech. Ekman and Friesen [11] specifically 
studied such nonverbal/ physical communication 
behaviors as indicators of deception. In particular, 
they explored how certain nonverbal cues—
unconsciously or subconsciously manifested by a 
party to a communication—operate to provide clues 
to deception. This phenomenon is referred to as 
nonverbal leakage. Granhag and Strömwall [16] 
likewise examined deception in a F2F context, using 
a credibility assessment technique, statement validity 
analysis (SVA), to evaluate both verbal and 
nonverbal behaviors during an in-person F2F 
interview event. Their findings indicate that speech 
rate, pauses, gaze aversion, and smiles/laughs were 
all salient and statistically significant nonverbal cues 
to deception. While physical-based cues (e.g., body 
language, facial expressions, and even vocal pitch 
and tone and pace of speech) are virtually non-
existent in text-based CMC environment, other verbal 
and nonverbal cues are indeed shared between CMC 
and F2F communication. 
 
3.2.2. CMC. Text-based CMC is “cue lean,” in that it 
lacks the physical cues to deception available in F2F 
communication. However, certain communication 
cues can nonetheless still be observed and catalogued 
within a CMC environment [17-19]. These 
communication features and language-action cues, 
such as first-person references, emotion words, 
inhibition words, prepositions, and conjunctions, 
have all been shown to be indicators that can 
differentiate deceivers from truth tellers [17]. Use of 
more or fewer sensory or spatiotemporal words, and 
changes in the diversity and complexity of language 
have also been shown to be indicative [20]. And, as 
in F2F, level of detail (less or more) is also 
suggestive of deception in CMC—although in CMC, 
relevance of detail appears to be more significant 
than “detail” per se. That is, deceivers in CMC tend 
to be wordier than truth-tellers, but the additional 
words (i.e., details) provided are not necessarily 
relevant or meaningful [19]. 
Another language-action cue that is important in 
CMC (also in F2F communication) is immediacy 
(i.e., ways in which a speaker can associate, or 
distance him/herself from the content of his/her 
message) [8]. Immediacy (whether verbal or non-
verbal) is particularly important in detecting 
deception. In the physical environment, nonverbal 
immediacy cues include eye contact, body language, 
facial expression, etc. While these specific cues were 
first studied in a F2F environment, certain cues—
such as delay in response—are also present in CMC, 
and operate similarly in both environments to create a 
psychological distance between deceiver and his/her 
communication partner [10]. 
It is worth noting that, in contrast to F2F 
interactions, CMC deceivers statistically tend to take 
shorter pauses between messages (i.e., time between 
two consecutive messages sent by them) than truth-
tellers [19]. Deceivers also have been found to have 
shorter response latency (i.e., time between receiving 
a message and responding to it) than truth-tellers, 
which is consistent with results of studies 
investigating response latency in F2F communication 
[19]. Research has also suggested that deceivers tend 
to use more restricted vocabulary and syntax, and to 
be more casual in their linguistic style [12]. 
Many of these cues have been examined for the 
purpose of developing an automated process to detect 
deceptive intent, and many of them—including 
quantity and consistency of detail—are measureable 
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in a dynamic exchange of text messages by focusing 
on specific features such as the use of adverbs, 
adjectives, and inclusive words. It is thus possible to 
benchmark verbal indicators (such as word count and 
details of information disclosed) and capture certain 
nonverbal behaviors (latency and usage of expression 
words) in CMC environment, which can then be 
statistically computed [19]. 
 
3.3. Environment 
 
Identification of deception is a complex problem 
that often requires ground truth verification [11, 15]; 
nevertheless, deception can be detected in 
interpersonal communication [1, 21-23] as well as 
group communication [24, 25]. Research into CMC 
deception cues has examined a variety of media types 
and modes of communication, while also exploring 
the role of media choice and mode of 
communication. The mode and medium of the 
communication provide dependencies that shape 
people’s communication behavior. Here, 
communication mode refers to whether the parties are 
interacting in real time (synchronous) or are 
communicating via messages exchanged back-and-
forth over time (asynchronous). Moreover, the mode 
of any communication—whether it takes place in a 
“virtual” CMC environment, or in a “real” F2F 
environment—can also influence how one interacts 
and communicates. One notable early study exploring 
this problem at a high level was done by Hancock, 
Thom-Santelli et al. [26]. Participants were asked to 
journal their interactions and lies for seven (7) 
consecutive days. The results were the foundation of 
their “feature-based” model for studying deceptive 
CMC, which attempts to derive cues to deceptive 
communication by examining the specific features of 
the medium chosen—particularly looking at the 
communication mode (i.e., synchronous, 
asynchronous, or either/both) associated with or 
supported by the medium. Other salient factors 
include whether the medium records the 
communication or not, and whether the 
communication is distributed. A fundamental 
assumption of this model is that deception is 
spontaneous, and therefore is more likely to occur 
when media is “synchronous and distributed, but non-
recordable” [10]. 
In this section, we briefly discuss studies that 
focus on both asynchronous and synchronous media 
types and communication modes in interpersonal as 
well as in group context. 
 
3.3.1 Asynchronous Communication. One of two 
main theoretical “schools of thought” coming out of, 
or supported by, this research—social distance 
theory—would seem most applicable when discussing 
asynchronous communication. According to social 
distance theory [27], the prevailing social disapproval 
of deception, and the accompanying psychological 
discomfort experienced by deceivers makes deceivers 
attempt to distance or separate themselves from their 
deception and the individual(s) they are attempting to 
deceive. Therefore, according to social distance 
theory, deceivers will tend to choose media offering 
fewer cues to the receiver of the communication and, 
thus, will be more likely to use an asynchronous mode 
of communication. 
A notable study examining language-action cues 
captured from e-mails was conducted by Zhou, 
Twitchell et al. [28]. This study evaluated deceptive 
cues in a team-based “desert survival scenario” game, 
and found that deceivers tended to be wordier as 
compared to truth-tellers—particularly in terms of 
using more verbs, modifiers and noun phrases in 
peripheral expressions to provide useless or irrelevant 
information. Moreover, Zhou and Zhang [19] found 
that, in the context of asynchronous online 
communication, deceivers tend to be more active in 
language usage, and take shorter pauses between 
messages and were more non-immediate than truth-
tellers (using more group references and modal 
verbs). Another study examining CMC deception in 
an asynchronous mode looked at the truthfulness of 
online dating profiles. Toma and Hancock [29] found 
that language-action cues involving emotion were 
“more powerful in predicting deception” than 
cognitive cues—with the notable exception that word 
count (a cognitive cue) was again highly significant. 
Likewise, Ott, Choi et al. [30] examined 
asynchronous CMC through the lens of online hotel 
reviews, investigating which linguistic features were 
most indicative of a truthful review. The results 
suggest that truthful reviews included more “sensorial 
and concrete language” (especially concerning spatial 
configurations—i.e. overall room space and space 
usage) than false or deceptive ones, while deceptive/ 
fake reviews included more superlatives. Language-
action cues in transcripts of 911 (emergency) 
telephone calls has also been studied [31], to 
determine which cues are most indicative of bogus or 
fake calls. The results from this study show that 
deceptive callers were found to show more 
“inhibition” (meaning, for example, delaying or 
telling the dispatcher to “hold on a minute”). 
Deceptive callers were also found to use more words 
associated with immediacy (1st person pronoun) and 
non-immediacy (3rd person pronoun). 
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3.3.2. Synchronous Communication. A second 
major theoretical framework—media richness 
theory—seems most applicable to synchronous 
communication. According to media richness theory, 
much, if not most, deceptive communication is 
equivocal in nature (i.e., intentionally ambiguous), 
and thus is open to interpretation by the receiver (i.e., 
the individual the communicator is attempting to 
deceive). Therefore, deceptive actors will tend to 
choose media types that provide them multiple cues, 
an opportunity for personalization, and immediate 
feedback (i.e., synchronous and spontaneous)—
allowing them to ensure the equivocal nature of their 
message and adjust their deceptive communication 
strategy ‘on the fly,’ and thereby obfuscate their 
deceptive intent [32, 33]. Four factors are used in 
determining the richness of the medium: feedback 
(spontaneous, immediate or delayed); number of cues 
available to the receiver (including social cues); 
language variety (i.e., the type and variety of symbols 
used to convey the particular message); and personal 
focus (i.e., infusing the message with personal feeling/ 
emotions [32]). The richer the medium, the better able 
it is to convey equivocal messages. 
Studies investigating CMC deception in a 
synchronous mode of communication have tended to 
focus on instant-messaging/ chat. For example, a 
study by Hancock, Curry et al. [34] found that word 
count was a significant predictor of deception in 
semi-synchronous communication. Participants in the 
dyad (consisting of one truthful and one deceptive 
partner) were given time (5 minutes) before play was 
to begin in which to review the fixed set of questions 
to be used, and plan their responses. Thus, the 
deceptive player was, in essence, given an 
opportunity to plan and prepare a strategy for 
implementing the intended deception(s). Further, 
Toma and Hancock [29] suggested that first person 
pronouns were used more by truth-tellers than 
deceivers, and that deceivers use fewer self-
references in CMC synchronous chat, but more third-
person references—consistent with social distance 
theory. To note, the differences of research 
methodology employed in the above-mentioned 
studies illustrates that timing is an important indicator 
for identifying computer-mediated deception. The 
collective representation of language-action cues 
varies depending on the time allocated to deceivers. 
 
3.3.3. Group Communication. Although many 
studies have focused on interpersonal interactions in 
CMC deception, a growing number of studies in this 
area have also examined CMC deception from a 
group-dynamics perspective. Taylor, Dando et al. 
[35], for example, examined language-action cues 
(specifically, personal pronouns, negative emotions, 
feelings, cognitive processes, discrepancy and 
tentative) in the context of deception through 
(asynchronous) e-mail exchanges, within and between 
teams in a common physical location. Taylor, Dando 
et al.’s [35] findings were consistent with findings 
from Toma and Hancock [29], [36], which indicate 
that the deceptive “insiders” used more personal 
pronouns than the others in their group. Additionally, 
Taylor, Dando et al. [35] found that the designated 
deceivers used more words associated with cognitive 
processes (particularly, discrepancy and tentative). 
This finding is contrary to the findings of Hancock, 
Toma et al. [18] which suggested that affect 
(emotion)-related words were more significant in 
detecting deception in online dating profiles. While 
both studies involved asynchronous communication, 
Taylor, Dando et al.’s [35] study examined group 
communication and interaction, and thus provides a 
different context than Hancock, Toma et al.’s [18] 
interpersonal communication studies on deception in 
online dating profiles. 
Ho, Hancock et al. [25], [24] examined behaviors 
of a deceptive “insider” in spontaneous synchronous 
chat-based group-dynamics context, and suggested 
that deceptive “insiders” in computer-mediated 
synchronous interactions will tend to use more words 
associated with cognitive processes. Ho, Hancock et 
al.’s [25] findings are consistent with those of Taylor, 
Dando et al. [35], and suggest that deceptive 
“insiders” tend to use words more associated with 
cognitive processes in their communication with their 
peers in either asynchronous or synchronous 
communication. 
 
4. Method  
 
Our study incorporates core components of the 
environment-mediated stigmergic signals by 
analyzing instances in pairwise interaction: deceivers 
(agents) and truth-teller (agents), collective 
language-action cues (signs) across different 
scenarios (environment) as context. The data 
collection and data cleaning process of this study are 
described in this section. 
 
4.1. Data Collection 
 
The data were collected in 2014 and 20151. Each 
game session consists of two players; a speaker and a 
detector. Data were collected across a total of 80 
                                                
1 The Florida State University’s Institutional Review Board 
has approved human subject data collection (Protocols 
#2014.13490 and #2015.15885). 
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game sessions. 40 participants (22 males and 18 
females) were randomly assigned into pairs, with each 
pair playing a total of 4 game sessions. Players were 
between 18 and 68 years of age. Players’ names were 
replaced with pseudo-names to protect their privacy. 
Each game session lasted approximately 30 
minutes, and consisted of about 4 role-play 
exchanges. At the end of each such exchange, the 
players’ roles were automatically changed. 
 
4.2. Data Cleaning Process 
 
The collected data were cleaned and spell 
checked. The spell checker corrected most of the 
spelling errors in the chat text, and common instant-
messaging abbreviations (“LOL,” “U,” “2,” “4,” etc.) 
were converted to their corresponding full written 
forms. Any individual message containing fewer than 
50 words total was excluded from the dataset because 
these messages do not contain meaningful sentences 
but gibberish words (e.g., yes, um, ok, etc.). The final 
data set used in analysis consisted of a total of 2,196 
lines of chat and 7,271 words. 
 
5. Research Design and Data Analysis 
 
This study investigates the collective language-
action cues as stigmergic signals that is most 
indicative of deceptive intent in interpersonal 
deception, specifically in spontaneous synchronous 
chat-based CMC (environment). The research 
approach focuses on developing specific metrics for 
collective language-action cues as represented by 
information behavior (signs), and analyzes 
communication patterns that distinguish between 
deceptive vs truthful actors (agents). This online game 
provides a conceptual basis for understanding, 
analyzing and designing ways to explore the dynamics 
of intentional deception. The identification of text-
based cues from these scenarios provides a means of 
understanding and measuring the decision parameters 
needed to detect online deception. It also enables us to 
observe how people lie successfully (or 
unsuccessfully) in different circumstances. 
 
5.1. Environment 
 
An interactive online game, called “Real or 
Spiel2,” was designed and developed to present 
players with real-time interactive simulated scenarios 
requiring them to exchange either deceptive or 
truthful statements specifically using instantaneous, 
                                                
2 Developed at Florida State University. 
synchronous communication channels [21]. Figure 1 
is a screenshot taken from a live game, and includes 
role assignment and ground truth question. 
 
 
Figure 1. Game interface [1] 
 
5.2. Agents 
 
Each game scenario involves two participants (i.e., 
players), who are placed in randomly assigned 
pairings by the research team, and then randomly 
assigned an outer role as either an initiating speaker 
or a detector in each gaming session. The speaker in 
each scenario is also randomly assigned an inner 
role—either saint (truthful) or sinner (deceptive)—by 
the RAND() random operator. The speaker establishes 
the ground truth before the beginning of each scenario 
by truthfully answering questions on a particular topic 
from common knowledge domains such as finance, 
skills or personal experiences. For example, the 
ground truth question might be something like “Have 
you ever visited Puerto Rico?” If, for example, the 
speaker has visited the location, s/he would establish 
the ground truth by answering “yes.” This provides a 
baseline against the assessment of the truthfulness or 
deceptiveness of his/her subsequent responses to the 
questions posed by the detector during the scenario. In 
the above example, the detector would ask questions 
designed to learn whether or not the speaker had 
visited the above-mentioned location, and the speaker 
would try to convince the detector that s/he has not 
visited such a location in the past. At the end of each 
scenario, the detector tries to determine whether the 
speaker was being deceptive or truthful based on 
question-and-answer exchanges. 
 
5.3. Language-action Cues and Signs 
 
The linguistic cues were extracted according to the 
categories established in the Linguistic Inquiry and 
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Word Count (LIWC) tool [20, 37] after the data had 
been cleaned. The specific LIWC categories we 
included in our analysis are those set forth in Figure 
1. In order to avoid or minimize possible 
multicollinearity problems, cues directly 
corresponding to the “main” LIWC headings of 
“cogmech” and “affect” were ultimately excluded, in 
favor of including cues from their respective 
subcategories (i.e., posemo, negemo, certain, incl, 
excl, etc.). 
 
Table 1. Language-action cues extracted by LIWC 
 
 
We analyzed the final dataset using logistic 
regression, with the dichotomous outcome variable 
“Deceiver” (0=truthful/ 1=deceiver). Our 
independent/ predictor variables were the LIWC 
categories illustrated in Table 1, plus ‘time-lag.’ 
 
Table 2. Fitness of the model 
 
 
The model incorporating these variables was 
statistically significant (p=0.003), as indicated in 
Table 2. The specific variables and corresponding 
statistical significance are set out in Table 3. In this 
model, we found that two language-action cues were 
statistically significant: Word Count (p=0.008) and 
Insight (p=0.02). However, the rest of the language-
action cues, individually, were not statistically 
significant in predicting or identifying potential 
deception. 
Nonetheless, logistic regression analysis indicates 
the model itself is significant with a Chi-square of 
χ2=35.8, p<0.01 (Table 2). While multicollinearity 
may provide one possible explanation for this 
apparently contradictory result (i.e., non-significant 
predictors, but strong overall model), we had already 
eliminated any variables that might have created such 
a problem. Instead, in this case, we attribute this 
phenomenon to the nature of communication: the 
context itself. It is the context—the combination of 
words—that is most indicative of deception, rather 
than the words alone. Thus, even if individual 
language-action cues themselves are not significant, a 
particular combination of language-action cues may 
well be significant in the ability to indicate deception. 
 
Table 3. Categorical variables 
 
 
5.4. Results and Discussion 
 
The initial logistic regression on this model was 
run with a (default) cut value of 0.5 (depicted in 
Table 4), and yielded an overall accuracy of 75% in 
correctly classifying “0s” (truth-tellers’ statements) 
and “1s” (deceivers’ statements). 
However, because the focus of our study is on 
identifying deceivers (i.e., classification as a “1”), the 
accuracy of the model specifically in categorizing 
“1s” is equally important as overall accuracy. The 
classification table (Table 4) shows the model to be 
75% accurate in correctly classifying both “1s” as 
deception and as “0s” as truthful statements (Table 
4), as well as having 75% overall accuracy. 
On initial review of the classification at 0.5 cut 
value would seem to be a fairly good model (Table 
4). However, as the objective of our study is to 
identify the model that optimizes the combination of 
overall accuracy and accuracy as to detecting 
deceivers (i.e., “1s”), we ran two additional models, 
using different cut-values. 
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Table 4. Classification at 0.5 cutoff 
 
 
The second iteration of the logistic regression 
analysis (depicted in Table 5) on this model was run 
with a cut value of 0.4. The model illustrated in 
Table 5 yielded an accuracy rate for classification of 
“1s” of 85% with a slightly lower overall accuracy of 
74% classifying truth-teller compared to the 75% 
accuracy of Table 4. 
 
Table 5. Classification at 0.4 cutoff 
 
 
We further ran a third round of logistic regression 
analysis at a cut value at 0.6 (depicted in Table 6). 
This model yielded an accuracy rate in classifying 
“1s” of only 65%, although the model classifies truth-
teller yielded 85% accuracy, and the overall model 
had an accuracy of 75% (which was not different 
from the results where the cut-off value was set to 
0.5). 
 
Table 6. Classification at 0.6 cutoff 
 
 
To reiterate, the objective of our study is aimed at 
computationally identifying deceptive agents based 
on collective language-action cues in text-based 
communication. Comparing results derived from the 
three different cut values, we suggest the model with 
cut value at 0.4 as illustrated in Table 5 is the 
optimal combination of overall accuracy at 73.8% 
due to the high accuracy as to classifying deceivers at 
82.5%. 
 
6. Limitations and Future Work 
 
One of the limitations involves with the adoption 
of the Google+ Hangout as the players’ 
communication platform. For example, players 
frequently experienced technical problems in logging 
into the Google+ pseudo accounts created for the 
game, and launching the game interface we 
developed.  It is our observation that these difficulties 
not only confused and distracted participants/ players, 
but also detracted from the overall amount of time 
they spent in the game itself, thus reducing our ability 
to collect more conversational data. To address this 
problem, our future work includes reconstructing the 
game on an independent/ stand-alone platform. We 
also plan to design and develop an automated 
participant assignment (i.e., pairing) system within 
the new platform, so that players are no longer 
manually paired. 
We believe that research participation should be 
carried out with benefits of both learning and fun 
experience to participants. We thus plan to increase 
the strength of competitive aspect of the game by 
systematically reporting participants’ guesses (i.e., 
correct or incorrect answers) during the game. By 
providing more feedback to the participants, it may 
help them make better decisions. At the same time, 
we can also observe how research participants make 
both deception decisions as well as detector’s 
decisions in capturing the liar. 
The final noteworthy limitation with respect to 
this study involves the sample size of the dataset, 
which we acknowledge is fairly small. We anticipate 
that in our future work, we will run the study to a 
broader audience of potential participants in order to 
get a larger dataset. Nonetheless, we submit that the 
results of the current study are still suggestive and 
encouraging. 
 
7.  Implications and Conclusions 
 
Computer-mediated deception can be modeled 
based on the core components of stigmergic signals 
including the agents, the environment, and the signs 
of communicative intent. This study demonstrates the 
efficacy of modeling stigmergic signals to 
differentiate deceivers (agents) from truth-tellers 
(agents) based on collective language-action cues 
(signs) in synchronous pairwise interaction 
(environment). Our results demonstrate that, in the 
context of text-based synchronous CMC, it is the 
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overall combination of language-action cues (signs), 
rather than specific words used by deceivers to 
deceive, as most indicative of deception. Research 
exploring machine learning approach appears 
promising in detecting computer-mediated deception 
[23]. Moreover, the merit of our game design 
specifically emphasizes not just synchronous 
communication—but spontaneity within synchronous 
communication [22]. That is, our results provide 
computational intelligence in differentiating 
computer-mediated deception in synchronous 
spontaneous CMC, and the results inform the design 
of a crowd-sourced online polygraph system in the 
CMC context where F2F interaction is not available. 
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